Is the Attention Economy Noxious? by Castro, Clinton & Pham, Adam K.
 
	 volume	20,	no.	17
 may	2020
Is the Attention  
Economy Noxious?
Clinton Castro & Adam K. Pham
Florida International University          California Institute of Technology
©	 2020	 Clinton	Castro	&	Adam	K.	Pham
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons 
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. 
<www.philosophersimprint.org/issue/>
1. Introduction
A	growing	amount	of	media	is	paid	for	by	its	consumers	through	their	
very	consumption	of	 it.	This	new	media	 is	highly	 interactive	and	re-
quires	 some	 form	of	 computing	 for	 its	 operation	 (Logan,	 2010).	 Ex-
amples	include	the	services	offered	by	Facebook,	Instagram,	Snapchat,	
and	YouTube.	As	these	examples	suggest,	much	new	media	is	funded	
primarily	 through	 advertising,	which	has	 been	optimized	using	Big	
Data.
New	media	differs	from	more	traditional	forms	of	media	in	its	abil-
ity	to	absorb	and	respond	to	information	about	consumers	in	real	time.	
Compare,	for	instance,	broadcast	television	with	YouTube.	People	liv-
ing	in	the	same	geographical	area	are	offered	roughly	similar	experi-
ences	of	broadcast	television:	they	are	offered	the	same	channels	 in	
the	same	order,	and	when	they	turn	to	the	same	channel,	they	see	the	
same	 content	 and	 the	 same	 advertisements.	When	people	 living	 in	
the	same	geographical	area	log	on	to	YouTube,	by	contrast,	it	is	not	at	
all	likely	that	they	will	be	offered	the	same	content.	Indeed,	it	is	not	
at	all	likely	that	people	living	under	the	same	roof	will	be	offered	the	
same	content	if	they	visit	the	site	separately.	This	is	because	the	site	
opens	to	a	handful	of	videos	carefully	tailored	to	what	YouTube	thinks	
the	current	user	might	be	interested	in	at	that	time.	If	two	users	watch	
the	 same	 video	 on	 separate	 devices,	 they	will	 very	 likely	 see	 differ-
ent	advertisements	(which	will	have	been	tailored	to	what	YouTube	
thinks	the	users	might	be	interested	in).	At	the	end	of	that	first	video,	
YouTube	will	queue	up	a	video	to	play	next.	Here,	too,	different	users	
will	receive	different	recommendations,	despite	having	just	watched	
the	same	video.	Part	of	this	high	degree	of	customization	is	possible	
because	YouTube	—	like	many	new	media	services	—	doubles	as	a	so-
cial	networking	site.1	In	the	case	of	YouTube,	this	allows	users	to	create	
1.	 Where	a	social networking site is	a	“web-based	service[]	that	allow[s]	individu-
als	to	(1)	construct	a	public	or	semi-public	profile	within	a	bounded	system,	
(2)	articulate	a	list	of	other	users	with	whom	they	share	a	connection,	and	(3)	
view	and	traverse	their	list	of	connections	and	those	made	by	others	within	
the	system”(boyd	and	Ellison,	2007,	p.	211).
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the	attention	economy	is	noxious,	and	we	use	our	assessment	to	moti-
vate	a	certain	sort	of	regulatory	response.
2. The Framework
Those	who	defend	“the	market”	typically	do	so	in	terms	of	two	favor-
able	characteristics	 that	 it	 is	 thought	to	possess:	optimality	and	free-
dom.	Markets	 are	 thought	 to	 promote	 optimality	 in	 the	 sense	 that	
conditions	of	long-run	perfect	competition	among	market	actors	tend	
to	 lead	 to	 a	 Pareto-optimal	 distribution	 of	 resources.2	 Markets	 are	
thought	to	promote	freedom,	in	the	sense	that	they	allow	individuals	
to	act	autonomously	and	voluntarily.	The	two	favorable	characteristics	
of	markets,	in	turn,	suggest	two	ethical	criteria	against	which	a	market	
in	a	particular	good	can	be	criticized:	a	criterion	related	to	the	market’s	
harmful	effects,	and	a	criterion	related	to	its	disrespect	to	agency.
The	first	of	these	criteria,	the	harm criterion,	relates	to	whether	the	
market	 tends	 to	engender	harmful	outcomes.	Following	Satz	 (2010),	
we	will	concern	ourselves	with	two	kinds	of	harms.	One	kind	of	harm	
involves	extremely	harmful	outcomes	for	individuals.	As	Satz	observes,	
we	can	identify	a	minimum	level	of	well-being	that	we	cannot	tolerate	
individuals	falling	below.	Yet	there	is	nothing	that	rules	out	the	possi-
bility	of	a	market	producing	destitution;	markets	can	be	economically	
efficient	yet	morally	problematic.
Another	kind	of	harm	 involves	harmful	outcomes	 for	 society as a 
whole.	If	a	particular	market	somehow	harms	the	institutions	that	are	
needed	 for	 individuals	 to	engage	effectively	 in	democracy,	 then	 the	
market	—	regardless	of	whether	it	is	efficient	—	might	be	morally	prob-
lematic.	This	explains,	for	example,	why	we	should	not	tolerate	a	mar-
ket	in	votes,	even	if	such	a	market	turns	out	to	be	Pareto-optimal.
The	second	of	 the	 two	ethical	criteria,	 the	agency criterion,	 relates	
not	to	the	outcomes	of	the	market,	but	rather	to	whether	it	somehow	
reflects	weakened	agency.	One	facet	of	the	agency	criterion	involves	
weakened cognitive agency:	 ways	 in	 which	market	 participants	 fail	 to	
2.	 A	situation	is	Pareto-optimal iff no	one’s	position	in	it	can	be	improved	without	
reducing	the	position	of	someone	else.
profiles,	“friend”	each	other,	and	track	mentions	of	their	profiles,	all	of	
which	bolsters	the	site’s	ability	to	capture	user	attention.
The attention economy,	the	economic	market	in	new	media	services,	
is	constituted	by	two	types	of	transactions:	those	in	which	consumers	
give	new	media	developers	their	literal	attention	in	exchange	for	a	ser-
vice	(such	as	a	news	feed	or	access	to	pictures	of	friends),	and	those	in	
which	developers	auction	off	consumer	attention	to	advertisers.
The	morally	salient	features	of	this	market	have	not	yet	been	fully	
appreciated.	A	growing	body	of	research	shows	that	new	media	con-
tributes	 to	anxiety,	depression,	 feelings	of	 loneliness,	self-harm,	and	
suicide	 (Twenge,	2017).	These	 technologies	also	contribute	 to	polar-
ization,	balkanization,	and	extremism	(Sunstein	[2017];	Alfano	et	al.	
[2018];	 Nguyen	 [forthcoming]).	 Further,	 new	media	 is	 extremely	 ad-
dictive	by	design.	Popular	design	guides	for	building	smartphone	ap-
plications,	such	as	Nir	Eyal’s	Hooked,	offer	developers	evidence-based	
tactics	 for	manufacturing	addiction	 to	products,	via	 the	exploitation	
of	 cognitive	 biases	 (such	 as	 the	 fear	 of	missing	 out,	 social	 compari-
son,	status	quo	bias,	framing	effects,	and	anchoring	effects	[Williams,	
2018]).	New	media	companies	are	built	on	a	business	model	that	goes	
back	to	the	1830s,	when	The New York Sun decided	to	rely	on	advertis-
ing	sold	to	its	large	readership	as	its	main	source	of	revenue	(Postman,	
1993;	Wu,	 2016),	 and	 these	 companies	will	 still	 go	 to	 any	 length	 to	
capture	our	attention.	Google’s	AlphaGo	has	put	been	put	to	work	at	
generating	YouTube	recommendations	(Rowan,	2015).	As	James	Wil-
liams	puts	it,	this	means	that	“the	same	intelligence	behind	the	system	
that	defeated	the	human	world	champion	at	the	game	Go	is	sitting	on	
the	other	side	of	your	screen	and	showing	you	videos	that	it	thinks	will	
keep	you	using	YouTube	for	as	long	as	possible”	(Williams,	2018	p.	90).
In	light	of	these	considerations,	we	think	that	there	is	good	reason	
to	ask	whether	we	should	tolerate	the	attention	economy	in	its	current	
form.	We	 explore	 this	 question	 by	 deploying	 a	 framework	 inspired	
by	Debra	Satz	 (2010),	who	has	offered	an	analysis	of	what	makes	a	
market	in	a	particular	good	noxious —	that	is,	what	makes	that	market	
“toxic	to	important	human	values”	(Satz,	2010,	p.	3).	We	conclude	that	
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the	Youth	Risk	Behavior	Surveillance	System	(YRBSS),4	the	American	
Freshman	 (AF)	 survey,5	 and	 the	General	Society	Survey	 (GSS).6	Fol-
lowing	 her	 argumentative	 strategy,	 we	will	 argue	 for	 these	 connec-
tions	by	first	establishing	correlations	between	new	media	consump-
tion	and	these	negative	mental	health	outcomes.	We	will	then	show	
that	major	spikes	in	incidences	of	these	negative	outcomes	coincided	
with	 the	widespread	adoption	of	 smartphone	 technology	 (the	main	
channel	of	new	media	consumption).	Along	the	way,	we	will	cite	a	few	
trial	studies	that	serve	as	an	independent	source	of	evidence	for	our	
causal	claims.
Twenge’s	data	paints	a	clear	picture	of	the	correlation	between	new	
media	consumption	and	poor	mental	health	outcomes.	Her	analysis	
of	 the	MtF	database	revealed	that	consumption	of	social	media	was	
associated	with	high	relative	risks7	of	unhappiness	(greater	than	50%),	
loneliness	(greater	than	10%),	and	high	depressive	symptoms8	(great-
er	than	25%)	(Twenge,	2017,	pp.	78–82).	It	 is	worth	noting	here	that	
many	activities	 (and,	 in	 fact,	 all	 in-person	activities)	exhibited	nega-
tive	correlations	with	negative	mental	health	outcomes;	the	most	dra-
matic	(and	perhaps	least	surprising)	comparison	is	with	sports	and	ex-
ercise,	which	decreased	unhappiness,	 loneliness,	and	high	depressive	
symptoms	by	greater	than	35%,	25%,	and	40%	(respectively).	Twenge’s	
analysis	of	the	YRBSS	revealed	that	teens	who	spend	3	hours	a	day	or	
more	on	electronic	devices	are	35%	more	likely	to	have	a	suicide	risk	
factor.9	The	MtF	database	revealed	that	high	school	seniors	spent	an	
4.	 YRBSS	is	a	Center	for	Disease	Control	and	Prevention	initiative	that	has	sur-
veyed	high	school	students	since	1991	(Twenge,	2017).
5.	 AF	is	a	Higher	Education	Research	Institute	initiative	that	has	surveyed	col-
lege	freshmen	since	1966	(Twenge,	2017).
6.	 GSS	has	surveyed	adults	since	1972	(Twenge,	2017).
7.	 A	relative risk	is	the	increased	(or	decreased)	chance	of	one	thing	happening	
given	another	thing	(Twenge,	2017,	Appendix	A).
8.	 Defined	as	agreeing	with	‘I	feel	like	I	can’t	do	anything	right’,	‘My	life	is	not	
useful’,	or	‘I	do	not	enjoy	life.’
9.	 A	suicide	risk	factor	is	a	“yes”	answer	to	any	of	the	following:	“feeling	very	
sad	and	hopeless	for	two	weeks”,	“seriously	considering	committing	suicide”,	
instantiate	 the	characteristics	of	an	 ideally	rational	actor.	To	be	sure,	
no	one	can	fully	live	up	to	such	ideals.	But	our	distance	from	them	is,	
in	some	cases,	of	moral	significance,	such	as	when	particularly	irratio-
nal	or	incontinent	market	actors	(such	a	young	children	or	addicts)	are	
incorrectly	assumed	to	be	autonomous	choosers,	and	thus	are	wrong-
ly	regarded	to	be	bound	by	and	held	responsible	for	their	choices.
The	other	facet	of	the	agency	criterion	is	concerned	with	the	exploi-
tation	of	people’s	vulnerabilities:	their	urgent	and	nonnegotiable	needs.	
Possessing	a	 vulnerability	of	 this	 sort	undermines	one’s	 standing	 to	
bargain.	 Markets	 that	 are	 characterized	 by	 such	 vulnerabilities	 are	
a	source	of	concern	because	agents’	choices	under	 those	conditions	
fail	to	be	voluntary.	An	example	is	sweatshop	labor	in	the	developing	
world.
So,	there	are	four	dimensions	by	which	markets	can	be	evaluated:	
harms to individuals, harms to society,	and	the	market’s	reflecting	or	en-
gendering	weakened cognitive agency	and	vulnerability.	Satz	notes	 that	
high	enough	marks	in	any	one	of	these	dimensions	can	make	a	market	
noxious	(Satz,	2010	p.	98).	In	what	follows,	we	show	that	the	attention	
economy	scores	highly	across	all	four.
3. The Evaluation
3.1 The Harm Criterion
The	attention	economy	is	a	source	of	extreme	harm,	both	to	individu-
als	and	to	society	as	a	whole.	In	3.1.1	and	3.1.2,	we	will	discuss	each	of	
the	two	sources	of	harm	in	turn.
3.1.1 Harms to Individuals
Consumption	 of	 new	media	 causes	 anxiety,	 depression,	 feelings	 of	
loneliness,	 self-harm,	 and	 suicide	 (Twenge,	 2017),	 and	 the	attention	
economy	is	implicated	in	these	concerns.
Jean	 Twenge	 offers	 a	 careful	 analysis	 of	 these	 causal	 connec-
tions,	using	data	from	four	databases:	Monitoring	the	Future	(MtF),3 
3.	 MtF	has	asked	high	school	seniors	more	than	1,000	questions	per	year	since	
1976,	and	8th	and	10th	graders	since	1991	(Twenge,	2017).
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The	AF	 shows	 a	 similar	 pattern	 in	 college	 students.	 As	 of	 2016,	 all 
indicators	of	mental	health	problems	hit	all-time	highs,	with	95%	re-
porting	that	they	feel	depressed.	According	to	the	National	Survey	on	
Drug	Use	and	Health	(NSDUH),	a	national	in-person	survey	of	more	
than	17,000	teens	 that	was	conducted	by	 the	Department	of	Health	
and	Human	Services	from	2004	to	2015,	these	spikes	in	mental	health	
problems	have	been	accompanied	by	spikes	diagnosable	depression	
and	suicide.	In	2015	the	survey	reported	that	diagnosable	depression	
in	teens	had	increased	by	56%	since	2010	(Twenge,	2017,	p.	108).	This	
coincided	with	a	surge	in	national	suicide	rates,	which	hit	a	30-year	
high	in	2016	(Tavernise,	2016).
The	sharp	rise	 in	 these	distressing	numbers	coincided	almost	ex-
actly	with	 the	 time	 that	 smartphones	became	ubiquitous	 (and,	 as	 a	
result,	 in-person	 interaction	measurably	 dropped)	 (Twenge,	 2017,	 p.	
104).	This	correlation	alone	does	not	suggest	that	new	media	caused	
the	tidal	wave	of	mental	health	problems	that	are	reflected	in	the	AF, 
MtF,	GSS,	and	YRBSS.	However,	the	timing,	when	conjoined	with	the	
correlational	and	trial	data,	does	suggest	that	new	media	causes	nega-
tive	mental	health	outcomes,	a	serious	harm	to	individuals.
In	 light	of	 this	discussion,	 it	 is	 tempting	to	think	that	new	media	
consumption	in	general	is	associated	with	negative	mental	health	out-
comes	 for	 all	populations.	However,	 this	generalization	may	not	be	
true.	Twenge’s	databases	track	8th-	and	10th-graders,	high	school	stu-
dents,	college	freshmen,	and	adults.	They	do	not,	however,	track	older	
adults	specifically,	and	there	is	some	reason	to	think	that	social	media	
in	fact	benefits	this	population.	For	example,	Hutto	et	al.	(2015)	found,	
among	older	adults,	a	negative	correlation	between	high	frequency	of	
social	media	use	and	perceived	loneliness	and	a	positive	correlation	
between	social	media	use	and	satisfaction	with	one’s	social	role.	These	
findings	are	 intuitive.	Social	media	allows	older	adults,	whose	 “real”	
(as	opposed	to	online)	social	networks	shrink	over	time	(Cornwell	et	
al.,	2008),	to	augment	their	communications	with	family	and	friends.	
Further,	as	Anja	Leist	(2013)	notes,	older	adults	come	to	social	media	
with	more	stable	self-concepts	and	relationships	 than	 their	younger	
average	of	2	½	hours	a	day	texting,	2	hours	a	day	on	the	Internet,	1	½	
hours	a	day	on	electronic	gaming,	and	a	half	hour	on	video	chat	—	a	
total	of	6	hours	per	day	on	new	media	(Twenge,	2017,	p.	51).
In	response	to	the	above	correlations,	it	is	natural	to	ask	which	way	
the	 causal	 arrow	 runs:	Does	new	media	 consumption	make	people	
lonely,	unhappy,	and	depressed;	or	does	being	lonely,	unhappy,	and	
depressed	make	people	consume	new	media?	The	following	three	tri-
als	are	suggestive	of	the	former.	Tromholt	(2016)	assigned	randomly	
chosen	participants	the	task	of	quitting	Facebook	for	a	week.	The	treat-
ment	group	showed	significant	increases	in	life	satisfaction,	positive	
emotions,	satisfaction	with	their	social	life,	and	ability	to	concentrate;	
they	also	showed	significant	decreases	in	negative	emotions	and	were	
55%	less	 likely	to	feel	stressed.	Kross	et	al.	(2013)	text-messaged	col-
lege	students	five	times	a	day	to	examine	how	Facebook	influenced	
how	they	felt	moment-to-moment	and	how	it	affected	their	life	satis-
faction;	they	found	that	Facebook	use	predicted	decline	in	both	factors.	
They	also	found	that	declines	in	these	factors	did	not	predict	Facebook	
use.	Shakya	and	Christakis	(2017)	analyzed	three	years	of	nationally	
representative	data	from	the	Gallup	Panel	Social	Network	Study	and	
found	similar	 trends	amongst	adults.	This	 study	also	noted	 that	not	
only	does	social	media	use	negatively	affect	well-being,	but	it	also	de-
tracts	from	activities	that	increase	well-being,	such	as	face-to-face	in-
teractions.	This	suggests	that	the	direct	negative	effects	of	new	media	
are	compounded	by	an	indirect	effect:	it	takes	us	away	from	activities	
that	have	a	positive	influence	on	our	well-being.
As	a	final	piece	of	evidence	 for	 the	claim	that	new	media	causes	
mental	 health	 problems,	 consider	 the	 following:	 Right	 around	 2011,	
there	 began	 an	 unprecedented	 spike	 in	 mental	 health	 problems	
among	teens	and	college	students,	a	trend	that	has	continued	to	the	
present	(Twenge,	2017).	In	2011,	for	example,	we	see	loneliness	in	the	
MtF	 (which	 surveys	 teens)	 rise	 to	unprecedented	 rates.	Around	 the	
same	time,	the	MtF	reveals	an	upward	trend	in	depressive	symptoms.	
“making	a	plan	to	commit	suicide”,	or	“having	attempted	to	commit	suicide”	
(Twenge,	2017,	p.	83).	
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that	prides	itself	on	being	a	space	for	free	expression.	Indeed,	he	an-
nounced	his	plans	on	the	site	before	the	mass	murder	(Stewart,	2019).	
8chan’s	 stance	 on	 freedom	of	 expression	has	made	 it,	 in	 the	words	
of	technology	journalist	Emily	Stewart,	“a	space	where	reprehensible	
ideas	 not	 only	 survive,	 but	 flourish,	 and	 extremists	 gather	 to	 share	
their	views	and	egg	each	other	on”	(Stewart,	2019).
The	Christchurch	 shooter	 is	 not	 the	 only	white	 nationalist,	 lone-
wolf	 terrorist	 associated	 with	 the	 site.10	 Six	 weeks	 after	 the	 Christ-
church	shooting,	the	2019	Poway	shooting	occurred	(where	one	person	
was	murdered	at	the	Poway	synagogue	in	San	Diego,	California).	The	
Poway	shooter	posted	a	manifesto	on	8chan,	stating,	“I’ve	only	been	
lurking	[on	8chan]	for	a	year	and	a	half,	yet	what	I’ve	learned	here	is	
priceless.	It’s	been	an	honor”	(Stewart,	2019).	The	first	response	to	the	
post	was	another	user	telling	the	shooter	to	“get	a	high	score”	—	that	is,	
to	kill	a	lot	of	people	(Stewart,	2019).
Niche	information	channels	are	also	engines	for	polarization.	Con-
sider,	for	example,	Schkade	et	al.	(2007),	where	groups	of	liberals	and	
groups	 of	 conservatives	were	 asked	 to	 discuss	 issues	 such	 as	 same-
sex	marriage,	affirmative	action,	and	global	warming.	In	almost	every	
group	studied,	group	members	left	the	discussion	with	more	extreme	
views	than	they	had	before.	Liberals’	support	of	measures	to	mitigate	
global	warming,	affirmative	action,	and	same-sex	marriage	grew,	as	
did	 conservatives’	 opposition	 (Schkade	 et	 al.,	 2007).	 These	 sorts	 of	
10.	Nor,	 sadly,	 are	 these	 the	 only	 examples	 of	 those	 who	 became	 terrorists	
through	online self-radicalization,	the	adoption	of	extreme	convictions	through	
self-directed	engagement	with	the	Internet.	Among	many	others,	Jose	Pimen-
tel	(who	was	arrested	in	2011	for	building	homemade	pipe	bombs	targeted	at	
veterans	of	the	Iraq	and	Afghanistan	wars),	Tamerlan	and	Dzhokhar	Tsarnaev	
(perpetrators	of	the	2013	Boston	Marathon	bombing),	Dylann	Roof	(perpetra-
tor	of	the	2015	Charleston	church	mass	shooting),	Omar	Mateen	(perpetrator	
of	the	2016	Pulse	night	club	shooting),	and	Alek	Minassian	(perpetrator	of	
the	2018	Toronto	van	attack)	are	the	products	of	online	self-radicalization	(Al-
fano	et	al.	[2018]).	For	illuminating	discussions	of	the	mechanisms	that	drive	
online	self-radicalization,	see	Alfano	et	al.	(2018)	and	Nguyen	(forthcoming).
counterparts,	which	may	protect	them	from	at	least	some	of	the	ill	ef-
fects	of	social	media.
3.1.2 Social-Level Harms
The	attention	economy	is	not	only	a	driver	of	extreme	harms	to	par-
ticular	individuals;	it	is	also	a	driver	of	significant	harms	to	society	as	
a	whole.	In	addition	to	whatever	the	social-level	effects	of	the	surge	in	
mental	health	issues	ushered	in	by	new	media	might	be,	new	media	
harms	society	by	contributing	to	political	polarization,	balkanization,	
and	extremism	(Sunstein,	2017).
New	media	contributes	to	these	odious	outcomes	by	offering	niche,	
customized	 information	 channels	 and	 by	 allowing	 consumers	 with	
niche	interests	to	find	each	other	with	ease.	As	Van	Alstyne	and	Bryn-
jolfsson	(2005)	put	it:
Because	the	Internet	makes	it	easier	to	find	like-minded	
individuals,	 it	can	 facilitate	 the	creation	and	strength	of	
fringe	 communities	 that	 have	 a	 common	 ideology	 but	
are	 dispersed	 geographically.	 Thus,	 particle	 physicists,	
oenophiles,	Star Trek	fans,	and	members	of	militia	groups	
have	used	the	Internet	to	find	each	other,	swap	informa-
tion	and	stoke	each	others’	passions.	In	many	cases,	their	
heated	dialogues	might	never	have	reached	critical	mass	
as	 long	as	geographic	 separation	diluted	 them	 to	a	 few	
participants	 per	 million	 (Van	 Alstyne	 and	 Brynjolfsson,	
2005,	p.	3).
Because	new	media	thrives	on	attention,	it	makes	finding	like-minded	
individuals	easy	(think,	for	example,	of	the	hashtag).
The	kind	of	ideological	sorting	that	this	enables	is	an	engine	for	ex-
tremism.	Consider,	for	example,	the	role	that	social	media	has	played	
in	the	radicalization	of	the	perpetrators	of	recent	acts	of	lone-wolf	ter-
rorism,	such	as	the	2019	Christchurch	shooting	(where	some	50	peo-
ple	were	murdered	at	 two	mosques	 in	Christchurch,	New	Zealand).	
The	Christchurch	shooter	was	a	denizen	of	8chan,	a	social	media	site	
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another,	older	form	of	media	that	is	prone	to	offering	consumers	free,	
niche	information	channels:	talk	radio.
Political	commentary	on	the	radio	ascended	in	the	late	1980s	and	
early	1990s	with	the	1987	fall	of	the	fairness	doctrine	(Berry	and	Sobi-
eraj,	2016).	These	new	political	commentary	shows,	such	as	The Rush 
Limbaugh Show,	 were	 characteristically	 reactive (responding	 to	 news	
as	opposed	to	breaking	it),	 ideologically selective	 (rather	than	address-
ing	 all	 major	 political	 developments,	 addressing	 only	 those	 which	
are	compelling	from	a	particular	ideological	vantage	point),	engaging 
(more	 entertaining	 than	 conventional	 commentary),	 and	 internally 
intertextual	 (making	many	 references	 to	other	hosts	or	 shows	 in	 the	
genre)	 (Berry	and	Sobieraj,	 2016).	These	 characteristics	—	which	are	
interconnected:	ideological	selectivity	contributes	to	engagement	and	
so	forth	—	created	a	sense	of	community	around	these	shows.	In	the	
case	of	certain	shows,	this	served	the	important	purpose	of	increasing	
the	perceived	credibility	of	some	actors	(the	host,	the	listeners,	hosts	
of	ally	shows,	etc.)	and	discrediting	others	(persons	the	host	disproves	
of,	non-listeners,	hosts	of	enemy	shows,	etc.),	 thus	 forming	an	echo	
chamber	(cf.	Nguyen,	[forthcoming]).
This	reactive,	ideologically	selective,	engaging,	internally	intertex-
tual	content	is	characteristic	of	talk	radio	and	new	media.	This	is	no	
doubt	because	new	media	and	talk	radio	have	in	common	the	funding	
model	pioneered	by	The New York Sun (i.e.,	relying	on	advertising	in-
stead	of	subscription	for	revenue),	and	this	kind	of	content	effectively	
attracts	a	 loyal	base	 to	be	advertised	 to.	 Indeed,	 this	 funding	model	
is	 commonly	 thought	 to	be	why	 certain	 sites,	 such	as	YouTube,	 are	
biased	towards	extreme	content	(see,	for	example,	Lewis	[2018]).	As	
Guillaume	Chaslot,	 a	 former	YouTube	 engineer,	 put	 it,	 “YouTube	 is	
something	that	looks	like	reality,	but	it	is	distorted	to	make	you	spend	
more	time	online.	[…]	The	recommendation	algorithm	is	not	optimis-
ing	for	what	is	truthful,	or	balanced,	or	healthy	for	democracy”	(Lewis,	
2018).	Reflecting	on	his	time	at	YouTube,	Chaslot	stated,	“Watch	time	
was	 the	 priority.	 […]	 Everything	 else	 was	 considered	 a	 distraction”	
(Lewis,	2018).
results	 have	 been	 reproduced	 dozens	 of	 times,	 in	 experiments	 the	
world	over	(Sunstein,	2017).11
In	addition	to	whatever	damage	it	does	to	democracy	via	 its	con-
tribution	to	polarization,	new	media	also	undermines	democracy	by	
eroding	 the	 shared	 basis	 of	 experiences	 needed	 for	 deliberative	 de-
mocracy.	 As	 Eli	 Pariser	 writes,	 “Democracy	 requires	 citizens	 to	 see	
things	from	another’s	point	of	view,	but	instead	we’re	more	and	more	
enclosed	in	our	own	bubbles”	(Pariser,	2011,	p.	5).	Insofar	as	new	me-
dia	encourages	the	development	of	epistemic	bubbles	and	echo	cham-
bers	 in	 the	pursuit	of	attention	capture,	 it	 is	at	odds	with	our	demo-
cratic	ideals.	Certainly,	Facebook	has	ambitions	of	wholesale	person-
alization	of	the	Internet:	in	2010,	Facebook’s	Chief	Operating	Officer	
Sheryl	Sandberg	said	the	idea	of	a	website	that	isn’t	customized	to	a	
particular	user	will	soon	seem	quaint	(Kirkpatrick,	2010).
Indeed,	 personalization	 has	 spread	 across	 the	 web:	 Facebook’s	
News	Feed,	a	major	source	of	news	for	many	Americans	(Shearer	and	
Gottfried,	 2017),	 is	 tailored	 to	 show	 users	what	 the	 site’s	 algorithm	
thinks	they	most	want	to	see.	Web	browsers,	such	as	Google	Chrome,	
interface	with	sites	like	YouTube	to	curate	video	suggestions.	Search	
engines,	such	as	Google,	now	personalize	results	such	that	different	
users	will	see	different	results	when	they	enter	the	same	search	terms	
(Pariser,	2011,	p.	2).	This	means	that	many	a	user	now	has	a	highly	per-
sonalized	information	diet,	and	thus	lives	in	what	Pariser	calls	a	“filter	
bubble”.	These	filter	bubbles	can	be	global	in	scope:	for	example,	on	
Google	Maps	UK,	the	Crimean	Peninsula	is	drawn	as	a	disputed	ter-
ritory;	on	Ukrainian	Google	Maps,	the	territory	is	included	as	part	of	
Ukraine;	and	on	Google	Maps	Russia,	it	is	included	as	part	of	Russia.	
With	 the	growth	of	 such	radical	personalization,	filter	bubbles	have	
become	difficult,	if	not	impossible,	to	escape.
It	is	worth	pausing	here	to	note	some	similarities	and	differences	
between	the	niche	information	channels	of	new	media	and	those	of	
11.	 See,	for	example,	Brown	(2003),	Zuber	et	al.	(1992),	Abrams	et	al.	(1990),	My-
ers	(1975),	and	Sunstein	et	al.	(2006).
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other	caller.	But	because	of	its	emphasis	on	interactivity,	new	media	
offers	each	of	us	this	affordance,	marking	a	very	big	difference	in	de-
gree	of	engagement	between	the	two	mediums.
3.2 The Agency Criterion
The	attention	economy	also	involves	elements	of	weakened	cognitive	
agency	and	vulnerability.	In	3.2.1,	we	discuss	the	aspects	of	weakened	
agency	it	reflects,	and	in	3.2.2,	we	discuss	the	vulnerabilities	it	exploits.	
3.2.1 Weakened Cognitive Agency
Nir	 Eyal’s	 best-selling	 design	 guide	 for	 smartphone	 applications	
Hooked: How to Build Habit-Forming Products	 begins	with	 some	 statis-
tics:	79%	of	smartphone	owners	check	their	device	within	15	minutes	
of	waking	up;	1/3	of	Americans	would	rather	give	up	sex	than	their	
phones;	the	average	user	checks	their	phone	more	than	150	times	per	
day	(Eyal,	2014,	p.	2).	“Face	it,”	Eyal	concludes:	“We’re	hooked”	(Eyal,	
2014,	p.	2).
Eyal	goes	on	 to	explain	 that,	 in	 the	attention	economy,	manufac-
turing	habits12	is	“imperative	for	the	survival	of	many	products”	(Eyal,	
2014,	p.	2).	He	explains	how	developers	of	smartphone	applications	
can	use	the	research	of	behavioral	psychologists,	such	as	Ferster	and	
Skinner	(1957),	to	“hook”	users.
The	process	of	manufacturing	habits	turns	out	to	be	quite	simple.	
The	 “Hooked	Model”	 breaks	 it	 down	 into	 four	 steps.	 First,	 “trigger”	
the	user;	bring	their	attention	to	the	app	(via,	for	example,	a	notifica-
tion).	Second,	queue	an	action	 that	will	be	done	 in	 the	anticipation	
of	 a	 reward.	 This	 can	 be	 as	 simple	 as	 getting	 a	 user	 to	 check	 their	
messages	 or	 click	 on	 photos	 in	 their	News	 Feed.	 Third,	 give	 a	 vari-
able	reward	—	that	 is,	 tie	 the	action	to	outcomes	that	are	sometimes	
very	rewarding	(perhaps	a	slew	of	“likes”)	and	at	other	times	mundane	
(perhaps	another	picture	of	an	acquaintance’s	cat).	This	is	the	Hooked	
Model’s	most	powerful	tool.	As	Eyal	explains:
12.	 Eyal	 defines	 habits	 as	 “automatic	 behaviours	 triggered	 by	 situational	 cues:	
things	we	do	with	little	or	no	conscious	thought”	(Eyal,	2014,	p.	1).
Despite	 their	 similarities,	 the	niche	 information	channels	of	new	
media	are,	in	certain	respects,	more	pernicious	than	those	of	talk	radio.
One	reason	is	that	it	is	fairly	easy	to	disengage	from	talk	radio.	To	
disengage,	all	a	listener	needs	to	do	is	turn	the	radio	off.	New	media	
is	not	so	easy	to	escape.	This	is	for	several	reasons.	One	reason	is	that	
most	new	media	applications	send	notifications	to	users’	smartphones,	
alerting	 them	of	 content	 that	 they	may	be	 interested	 in	 (e.g.,	 some-
one’s	response	to	one	of	their	posts).	Smartphones,	unlike	radios,	are	
not	so	easily	turned	off.	As	we	will	discuss	in	the	next	section,	smart-
phone	users	are	quite	attached	to	their	devices.	Further,	these	devices	
often	 double	 as	work	 computers,	 so	many	users	mustn’t	 turn	 them	
off.	Another	 reason	has	 to	do	with	 the	 inter-	 and	 intra-connectivity	
of	new	media	sites	and	applications.	When	a	listener	turns	a	conven-
tional	radio	off	or	switches	stations,	other	radio	stations,	T.V.	channels,	
or	similarly	interested	parties	do	not	know	what	the	listener	was	just	
listening	to.	In	contrast,	when	a	user	leaves	a	site	or	application,	it	is	
often	known	by	other	sites,	applications,	or	interested	parties	what	the	
user	has	 just	done,	and	thus	what	 to	suggest,	display,	and	advertise	
to	 them.	This	can	also	happen	within	a	site.	 If	a	user	watches	some	
video	from	one	YouTube	channel	and	then	turns	to	some	other	kind	
of	 content,	 they	may	 receive	 suggestions	based	on	 their	 activity	 on	
the	previous	channel.	Their	advertising	experience	may	also	bear	the	
thumbprint	of	their	prior	activity.	Note	here	that	the	inter-	and	intra-
connectivity	of	new	media	can	make	the	filter	bubbles	that	encapsu-
late	us	exceptionally	difficult	to	escape.	This	simply	could	not	happen	
with	conventional	radios.
Another	important	difference	between	new	media’s	niche	informa-
tion	channels	and	their	predecessors	 is	 the	level	of	 interactivity	and	
thus	 engagement	 that	 they	 afford	 consumers.	 Social	media	 sites	 in	
particular	are	rife	with	emotionally	charged	exchanges	among	users.	
These	kinds	of	exchanges	are	difficult	for	participants	(as	well	as	on-
lookers)	to	disengage	from,	because	they	involve	their	ideas	and	their 
identity.	To	be	sure,	talk	radio	sometimes	features	callers	who	can	ex-
perience	the	same	kind	of	personal	engagement	with	an	issue,	host,	or	
	 clinton	castro	&	adam	k.	pham Is the Attention Economy Noxious?
philosophers’	imprint	 –		8		–	 vol.	20,	no.	17	(may	2020)
creators	—	it’s	me,	 it’s	Mark	 [Zuckerberg],	 it’s	Kevin	 Sys-
trom	on	Instagram,	it’s	all	of	these	people	—	understood	
this	consciously.	And	we	did	it	anyway	(Solon,	2017).
Given	that	the	attention	economy	is	built	on	a	model	of	“exploiting	a	
vulnerability	in	human	psychology”,	as	Parker	puts	it,	the	market	has	
its	source	in	weakened	cognitive	agency.
3.2.2 Vulnerability
The	 attention	 economy,	 finally,	 engenders	 and	 exploits	 people’s	
vulnerabilities.
“You	have	 to	 have	 an	 iPhone.	 It’s	 like	Apple	 has	 a	monopoly	 on	
adolescence,”	says	Billie,	one	of	the	hundreds	of	teenage	girls	Nancy	
Jo	Sales	interviewed	for	her	book	American Girls: Social Media and the 
Secret Lives of Teenagers.	“It’s	like	Apple	has	a	monopoly	on	adolescence”	
(Sales,	2016,	p.	251).	Billie	is	right.	As	of	2015,	two	thirds	of	US	teens	
owned	an	iPhone,	and	75%	planned	for	their	next	smartphone	to	be	
one	(Twenge,	2017).	Speaking	about	social	media,	Emily,	a	teen	Jean	
Twenge	 interviewed	for	 the	book	 iGen,	 says,	 “Everyone	uses	 it.	 It’s	a	
good	way	 to,	 like,	make	 plans	with	 people.	 If	 you	don’t,	 you	might	
miss	out	on	plans	that	you	could	have	gone	to”	(Twenge,	2017,	p.	53).13 
Like	Billie,	Emily	is	right.	As	of	2015,	97%	of	12th-graders	and	98%	of	
12th-grade	girls	used	social	media	sites,	making	the	adoption	of	these	
platforms	nearly	universal	(Twenge,	2017,	p.	55).	For	many	teens,	en-
gagement	with	new	media	feels	—	and	perhaps	is	—	mandatory.
This	 is	not	 just	 the	case	 for	 teens.	 Increasingly,	adult	new	media	
users	don’t	have	a	choice	whether	or	not	 to	participate	 in	 the	atten-
tion	economy.	Business	is	increasingly	conducted	on	social	network-
ing	platforms	such	as	Line,	WeChat,	WhatsApp,	and	Facebook,	mak-
ing	engagement	with	them	professionally	mandatory	(Lauria	2017).14 
Further,	 important	 social	 events,	 such	as	weddings,	 are	 increasingly	
13.	 Note	that	Eyal	(2014)	recommends	exploiting	fear	of	missing	out	as	a	mecha-
nism	for	“triggering”	users.
14.	 This	is	true	especially	in	Asia,	where	business	communication	via	these	apps	
is	preferred	to	communication	via	phone	or	email	(Lauria	2017).
Research	shows	that	levels	of	the	neurotransmitter	dopa-
mine	surge	when	the	brain	is	expecting	reward.	Although	
dopamine	is	often	wrongly	categorized	as	making	us	feel	
good,	introducing	variability	does	create	a	focused	state,	
which suppresses the areas of the brain associated with judge-
ment and reason while activating the parts associated with 
wanting and desire	(Eyal,	2014,	p.	7;	emphasis	added).
Eyal	 notes	 that	 this	 variable	 reward	 system	 is	 the	 same	mechanism	
that	 drives	 “many	 other	 habit-forming	 products”,	 such	 as	 “slot	 ma-
chines	 and	 lotteries”	 (Eyal,	 2014,	 p.	 7).	 The	 last	 step	 of	 the	Hooked	
Model,	“investment”,	involves	having	the	user	put	something	into	the	
product,	such	as	a	new	photo	or	post,	or	their	contact	information,	and	
is	meant	to	increase	the	chance	that	the	user	will	pass	through	another	
“Hook	cycle”	in	the	future.
If	 one	 uses	 social	 media,	 “freemium”	 games,	 or	 applications	 for	
managing	email	and	private	messages,	the	Hook	cycle	will	look	famil-
iar.	Eyal’s	insight	laid	the	blueprint	for	applications	we	are	all	familiar	
with.	As	Eyal	admits,	the	Hooked	Model	is	designed	to	make	an	end-
run	around	our	rationality.	And	there	 is	no	question	that	 the	model	
works	well,	even	at	global	scale.	Sean	Parker,	who	was	Facebook’s	first	
CEO,	comments	on	Facebook’s	strategy:
The	 thought	 process	 that	 went	 into	 building	 these	 ap-
plications,	Facebook	being	the	first	of	them,	[…]	was	all	
about:	“How	do	we	consume	as	much	of	your	time	and	
conscious	 attention	 as	 possible?”	 And	 that	 means	 that	
we	need	 to	 sort	of	 give	you	a	 little	dopamine	hit	 every	
once	 in	a	while,	because	someone	 liked	or	commented	
on	a	photo	or	a	post	or	whatever.	And	that’s	going	to	get	
you	 to	 contribute	more	 content,	 and	 that’s	 going	 to	get	
you	[…]	more	likes	and	comments.	It’s	a	social-validation	
feedback	loop	[…]	exactly	the	kind	of	thing	that	a	hacker	
like	myself	would	come	up	with,	because	you’re	exploit-
ing	a	vulnerability	 in	human	psychology.	The	 inventors,	
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4. Toward a Better Attention Economy
In	 two	 respects,	new	media	 is	 similar	 to	 cigarettes:	both	have	been	
proven	to	be	harmful	and	addictive.	For	this	reason,	we	think	the	his-
tory	of	tobacco	regulation	in	the	United	States	might	give	us	a	rough	
model	for	the	proper	regulatory	response	to	the	issues	with	the	atten-
tion	economy	that	have	been	outlined	in	this	paper.
By	 1964,	 when	 the	 Surgeon	 General	 released	 a	 report	 outlining	
some	of	the	harms	involved	in	tobacco	use,	those	harms	were	already	
well-known.	Yet,	when	the	first	federal	regulation	mandating	warning	
labels	on	cigarettes	appeared	in	the	United	States	only	a	year	later,	the	
new	laws	had	an	immediate	and	significant	effect	on	public	discourse.	
This	 law,	 called	 the	 Federal	Cigarette	 Labeling	 and	Advertising	Act 
(FCLAA),	did	not	aim	to	prohibit	the	market	for	tobacco	products	or	
even	to	mitigate	its	harms	through	“sin	taxes”.	Rather,	the	law	aimed	
at	strengthening	the	agency	of	consumers.	The	political	campaign	that	
underwrote	the	passage	of	the	law	was	highly	successful:	the	FCLAA 
enjoyed	 a	number	of	 updates	over	 time,	 culminating	with	 the	 2010	
Family	Smoking	Prevention	and	Tobacco	Control	Act,	which	explicitly	
empowered	the	FDA	to	regulate	the	industry.	Now,	fifty	years	after	the	
Surgeon	General’s	 report,	most	US	states	have	broad	smoking	bans,	
and	they	have	also	imposed	strict	regulation	on	advertising	and	strict	
penalties	for	selling	to	children.
The	reason	an	agency-based	approach	to	regulation	is	necessary	is	
that	the	erosion	of	the	power	of	the	tobacco	industry	would	not	have	
been	possible	without	substantial	democratic	buy-in.	In	large	part,	this	
erosion	was	due	to	anti-tobacco	shifts	in	public	opinion:	only	41%	of	
the	American	public	recognized	smoking	as	a	cause	of	heart	disease	
in	1954,	but	by	2013,	this	had	risen	to	91%.17	Prior	to	the	FCLAA,	Big	
Tobacco	was	not	simply	a	powerful	political	force	in	a	vacuum;	it	also	
sponsored	an	array	of	television	and	radio	programming,	and	tobacco	
products	enjoyed	endorsements	from	doctors,	athletes,	and	celebrities.	
There	were,	in	modern	parlance,	significant	“network	effects”	involved	
17.	 See	Gallup	polls	on	“Tobacco	and	Smoking”.
organized	 on	 social	media	 sites,	 such	 as	 Facebook,	making	 engage-
ment	with	these	sites	socially	mandatory.	These	facts,	combined	with	
the	ubiquity	of	smartphones,	make	new	media	all	but	 impossible	to	
avoid	for	many	adults.
This	 creates	 vulnerabilities	 that	do	not	depend	on	a	 lack	of	user	
understanding.	As	we	noted	in	the	last	section,	even	apps	that	seem	
innocuous,	such	as	those	used	to	monitor	one’s	email,	use	design	prin-
ciples	 that	 can	be	used	 to	 “hook”	 us.	 In	 the	 attention	 economy,	 ser-
vices	 that	purport	 to	have	one	affordance15	 (e.g.,	 connecting	 friends,	
checking	emails)	are	in	fact	ultimately	designed	to	keep	users	on	the	
application	as	long	or	as	frequently	as	possible,	with	the	ultimate	aim	
of	getting	the	user	to	click	on	ads	or	buy	services	(such	as	premium	
features).16	This,	after	all,	is	how	such	products	are	paid	for.	Were	the	
actual	 affordances	 of	 new	media	more	 salient	 and	were	 options	 to	
opt	out	of	 the	Hooked	Model	available,	our	concerns	would	not	ap-
ply	here.	However,	at	present,	many	simply	can’t	avoid	products	with	
these	design	features.
Finally,	it	is	important	to	note	that	it’s	not	only	sites	like	Facebook,	
Instagram,	 Snapchat,	 and	 YouTube	 that	 operate	 according	 to	 the	
Hooked	 Model.	 LinkedIn,	 ResearchGate,	 Academia.edu,	 and	 even	
PhilPeople	also	bear	 the	hallmarks	of	 that	model.	To	be	clear,	 these	
other	 platforms	 do	 not	 instantiate	 the	 problems	we	have	 discussed	
to	 the	 same	 degree:	 they	 are	 not	 funded	 primarily	 by	 third	 parties	
through	advertisements,	and	thus	do	not	require	or	motivate	the	same	
levels	of	engagement	in	their	users.	Yet,	they	still	neg	us	and	nudge	us	
into	using	them	and	run	us	through	Hook	cycles	when	their	triggers	
work.	Even	those	of	us	who	know	that	these	products	cause	addiction	
and	mental	 health	 problems	must	 use	 them	or	 face	 professional	 or	
social	exclusion.
15.	 An	affordance is	“a	relationship	between	the	properties	of	an	object	and	the	
capabilities	of	[…]	[an]	agent	that	determine	just	how	the	object	could	pos-
sibly	be	used	[by	the	agent]”	(Norman,	2013,	p.	11).	Chairs	are	for	sitting;	thus,	
for	most	adults,	such	chairs	afford	sitting.
16.	 For	further	discussion	of	this	issue	(though	not	exactly	in	these	terms),	see	
Williams	(2018).
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interventions	are	not	unprecedented	among	social	technologies:	dur-
ing	the	1990s,	arcade	games	across	North	America	carried	anti-drug	
slogans	 such	 as	 “Winners	Don’t	Use	Drugs”	 as	 part	 of	 their	 “attract	
mode”,	 the	pre-recorded	demo	video	 that	 is	 looped	when	no	one	 is	
playing	 them.	 Our	 strategy	 would,	 just	 as	 anti-smoking	 campaigns,	
aim	to	restrict	children’s	access	to	new	media	technologies,	to	avoid	
instilling	harmful	habits	in	an	especially	vulnerable	population.
A	more	diplomatic	way	of	implementing	the	product-labeling	strat-
egy	 than	mandating	a	warning	 screen	might	be	 to	encourage	game	
and	app	developers	to	establish	and	abide	by	some	sort	of	self-regula-
tory	organization	with	the	explicit	aim	of	managing	user	screen	time.	
This	idea,	too,	has	antecedents	in	the	history	of	social	technology:	the	
Entertainment	Software	Rating	Board	(ESRB)	was	established	in	1994	
by	the	video	game	industry’s	own	trade	association	for	the	purposes	of	
assigning	age	and	content	warnings,	and	the	ESRB	has	since	received	
praise	from	the	Federal	Trade	Commission	as	an	example	of	effective	
self-regulation.	In	this	vein,	a	screen	time	advisory	board	could	assign	
screen	time	ratings	for	each	app,	which	offer	an	independent	assess-
ment	of	the	risks	and	hazards	of	each	app.
However	implemented,	the	product-labeling	strategy	would	neces-
sarily	involve	a	branding	campaign	of	its	own,	extending	beyond	the	
targets	of	the	regulation,	to	include	television	billboards	and	product	
placements.	 The	 campaign	 should	 follow	 existing	 research	 on	 best	
practices	 in	 anti-smoking	 advertising,	 and	 should	 stress	 in	 particu-
lar	“the	positive	consequences	of	[limiting	new	media],	model	refusal	
skills,	convey	the	immediate	social	and	physical	problems	associated	
with	[new	media],	and	teach	adolescents	about	[new	media]	market-
ing”	(Pechmann	and	Reibling,	2000,	p.	25).	The	ultimate	objective	of	
the	campaign	might	be	to	cultivate	something	along	the	lines	of	Shan-
non	Vallor’s	 “global	 technomoral	virtue	ethic”	 (Vallor,	2016),	but	we	
accept	 the	more	modest	 goal	 that	users	be	 sufficiently	mindful	 and	
self-reflective	to	use	existing	aids	such	as	Apple’s	native	Screen	Time	
functionality.
in	maintaining	the	political	strength	of	the	tobacco	lobby.	Perhaps	un-
surprisingly,	then,	what	has	proven	to	be	most	effective	in	the	reduc-
tion	of	 tobacco	use	has	 been	 targeting	 these	network	 effects	 rather	
than	more	heavy-handed,	paternalistic	measures.	As	Cummings	and	
Proctor	(2014)	note:
Increasingly,	 research	 has	 demonstrated	 that	 the	 inter-
ventions	 that	 have	 the	 greatest	 impact	 on	 reducing	 to-
bacco	use	are	those	that	alter	the	social	contexts	and	in-
centives	for	using	tobacco.	Research	has	shown	that	the	
most	potent	demand-reducing	influences	on	tobacco	use	
have	 been	 interventions	 that	 impact	 virtually	 all	 smok-
ers	repeatedly,	such	as	higher	taxes	on	tobacco	products,	
comprehensive	advertising	bans,	graphic	pack	warnings,	
mass	 media	 campaigns,	 and	 smoke-free	 policies.	 De-
spite	promises	of	 the	efficacy	of	different	 stop	 smoking	
treatments,	there	is	not	much	evidence	that	any	of	these	
therapies	have	dramatically	reduced	rates	of	tobacco	use	
because	too	few	smokers	use	them	when	they	try	to	quit	
(Cummings	and	Proctor,	2014,	pp.	33–34).
The	regulatory	successes	in	the	tobacco	context	suggest	a	similar	gen-
eral	 approach	 in	 the	 context	of	new	media:	we	 should	not	 aim,	 for	
instance,	to	simply	limit	people’s	screen	time	simpliciter.	Luckily,	the	
motivation	for	limiting	screen	time	is	(just	as	was	the	motivation	for	
reducing	 tobacco	usage)	obvious,	given	 the	 facts.	 It	 is	now	obvious	
that	 increased	 screen	 time	 both	 harms	 us	 and	weakens	 our	 agency,	
both	as	a	society	and	as	individuals.
Our	regulatory	strategy	involves	a	 form	of	product	 labeling.	One	
radical	way	of	implementing	this	strategy	involves	mandatory,	unskip-
pable	 warnings:	 digital	 applications,	 websites,	 and	 platforms	might	
carry	 a	 warning	 to	 the	 effect	 of	 “CAUTION:	 THE DEPARTMENT 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES HAS DETERMINED THAT 
EXCESSIVE SCREEN TIME IS DANGEROUS TO YOUR MENTAL 
HEALTH.”	 However	 radical	 this	 sort	 of	 strategy	 might	 seem,	 such	
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Self-categorization	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 norm	 formation,	 confor-
mity	 and	 group	 polarization.	 British Journal of Social Psychology, 
29(2):97–119.
Alfano,	M.,	Carter,	J.	A.,	and	Cheong,	M.	(2018).	Technological	seduc-
tion	and	self-radicalization.	Journal of the American Philosophical As-
sociation,	4(3):298–322.
Berry,	J.	M.	and	Sobieraj,	S.	(2016).	The Outrage Industry: Political Opin-
ion Media and the New Incivility.	Oxford	University	Press.
boyd,	d.	m.	and	Ellison,	N.	B.	(2007).	Social	network	sites:	Definition,	
history,	 and	 scholarship.	 Journal of Computer-Mediated Communica-
tion,	13(1):210–230.
Brown,	R.	(2003).	Social Psychology, 2nd Edition.	Free	Press.
Cornwell,	 B.,	 Laumann,	 E.	O.,	 and	 Schumm,	L.	P.	 (2008).	 The	 social	
connectedness	of	older	 adults:	A	national	profile.	American Socio-
logical Review,	73(2):185–203.
Cummings,	K.	M.	and	Proctor,	R.	N.	 (2014).	The	 changing	public	 im-
age	of	smoking	in	the	United	States:	1964–2014.	Cancer Epidemiol-
ogy, Biomarkers & Prevention,	23(1):32–36.
Eyal,	N.	(2014).	Hooked: How to Build Habit-Forming Products.	Portfolio.
Ferster,	 C.	B.	 and	 Skinner,	 B.	F.	 (1957).	 Schedules of Reinforcement.	
Appleton-Century-Crofts.
Hutto,	C.	J.,	Bell,	C.,	Farmer,	S.,	Fausset,	C.,	Harley,	L.,	Nguyen,	J.,	and	
Fain,	 B.	 (2015).	 Social	 media	 gerontology:	 Understanding	 social	
media	usage	among	older	adults.	Web Intelligence,	13:69–87.
Isaac,	M.	(2019).	Mark	Zuckerberg’s	call	to	regulate	Facebook,	explained.	
The New York Times.	 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/30/tech-
nology/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-regulation-explained.html.
Kirkpatrick,	 M.	 (2010).	 Facebook	 exec:	 All	 media	 will	 be	 personal-
ized	in	3	to	5	years.	readwrite.	https://readwrite.com/2010/09/29/
facebook_exec_all_media_will_be_personalized_in_3/.
Kross,	E.,	Verduyn,	P.,	Demiralp,	E.,	Park,	J.,	Lee,	D.	S.,	Lin,	N.,	Shablack,	
H.,	Jonides,	J.,	and	Ybarra,	O.	(2013).	Facebook	use	predicts	declines	
in	subjective	well-being	in	young	adults.	PLOS ONE,	8(8):1–6.
Our	hope	is	that	such	response	might	help	to	make	at	least	some	
improvements	across	all	four	of	our	evaluative	criteria:	it	would	hope-
fully	change	the	way	new	media	is	used	and	designed,	thereby	mitigat-
ing	the	harms	and	affronts	to	agency	of	the	attention	economy.	Above	
all,	however,	we	want	to	emphasize	that	just	as	tobacco	use	has	been	
most	effectively	managed	by	attending	to	the	personal	incentives	and	
social	contexts	associated	with	it,	addressing	the	problems	associated	
with	excessive	screen	time	requires	a	solution	that	conceptualizes	us-
ers	as	agents,	not	a	solution	that	ignores	their	agency	altogether.
5. Conclusion 
Some	technology	executives,	such	as	Mark	Zuckerberg,	have	called	for	
regulations	on	Facebook	and	other	new	media	oligarchs	(Isaac,	2019).	
Zuckerberg’s	proposal	in	particular	addresses	a	number	of	important	
concerns	one	might	have	about	the	sources	of	social	dysfunction	in-
troduced	by	new	media:	its	tendency	to	promote	violent	or	antisocial	
content,	 its	 tendency	 to	undermine	 the	 integrity	of	 the	political	pro-
cess,	its	resistance	to	data	portability,	and	its	threat	to	people’s	privacy.
However,	Zuckerberg’s	proposal	pointedly	does	not	call	 for	 limit-
ing	screen	time.	This	omission	is	not	surprising	—	the	above	proposal	
cuts	to	the	heart	of	Facebook’s	business	model	—	but	the	noxiousness	
of	 the	attention	economy	is	no	 longer	plausibly	 in	doubt.	The	atten-
tion	economy	 is	 toxic	 to	 important	human	values,	because	 it	harms	
individuals	and	society	and	it	engenders	and	exploits	weakened	cog-
nitive	agency	and	vulnerability.	This	market,	however,	is	not	one	that	
we	need	to	live	with	in	its	current	form.	As	we	have	shown,	our	analy-
sis	sheds	some	light	on	the	proper	regulatory	response.	We	could	treat	
new	media	as	we	have	treated	other	harmful,	addictive	products:	we	
could	inform	users	of	its	effects	and	limit	children’s	access	to	it.
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